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NOTES 
OUT ON A LIMB:  
SUPPORT FOR A LIMITED VERSION  
OF COLLECTIVE SCIENTER 
MATT MCCABE† 
INTRODUCTION 
Scenario A: 
Imagine a situation where a company produces electronic 
goods.  In the beginning of 2013, the company releases an 
electronic widget as its new marquee product.  While this widget 
is revolutionary, it also has some significant safety problems.  
Soon after the release, the electronic widget begins to catch fire 
during use.  The company did not know of the safety problems 
when it first released the product.  Since the safety problems 
have arisen, the company’s stock price has dropped significantly.  
Shortly after the stock price began to decline, the CEO released 
press statements touting that they considered safety their 
primary goal and that they had fixed any defects in the electronic 
widget. 
While the company was making these statements, 
government regulatory agencies were doing their own 
investigation.  They found that the testing procedures the 
company employed were not adequate, and there was still a 
significant risk that these new products were dangerous.  
Moreover, the manufacturer circulated an internal memorandum 
that stated that the company still did not know the exact reason 
why the initial model would catch on fire, and the company was 
unsure of how to proceed. 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., magna cum laude, 2015, 
St. John’s University School of Law. 
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After the company made statements claiming to have fixed 
the defect, the stock price began to rebound.  However, soon 
after, the same problems began to arise in the devices that the 
company claimed to have fixed.  With such significant problems 
in its marquee product, the stock price, once again, plummeted. 
A stockholder brought a claim under Rule 10b-5 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, claiming that the company 
misrepresented the safety of the electronic widget.  Plaintiff-
stockholders, however, at this stage of the litigation have a very 
limited amount of information.  The plaintiffs know there was a 
government investigation, but do not know who the report was 
sent to or who was aware of the investigation.  Furthermore, they 
know that there was an internal memorandum, but they do not 
know who within the company had access to it.  Can the plaintiff 
shareholders adequately plead that the corporation acted with 
scienter without identifying specific individuals within the 
company who knew of the reports? 
Scenario B: 
Assume there is a company, distinct from the company of 
Scenario A, called Company B.  Company B is experiencing the 
same problems as Company A.  Company B released a new 
marquee electronic widget, which experienced severe safety 
problems.  Company B, however, genuinely believed that it had 
fixed the problem.  The CEO of the company made a statement 
affirmatively endorsing the product’s safety.  The CEO believes 
the statement he is making is true.  The janitor, however, a 
former electrical engineer who has been cleaning up around the 
manufacturing plant, has realized that defects still exist in the 
product.  Can the misstatement by the CEO be paired with the 
janitor’s knowledge of the statement’s falsity in order to 
sufficiently plead corporate liability for fraud? 
Scenario C: 
Alternatively, consider if Corporation B had two offices, one 
in New York and one in China.  The New York office is the 
corporate headquarters.  The CEO, stationed in the New York 
office, makes a statement about the safety of the new electronic 
widgets.  A corporate official in the China office, which also 
houses the manufacturing plant, knows that the statement is  
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false.  Can the misstatement by the CEO in New York be paired 
with the corporate official’s knowledge in China to adequately 
plead corporate liability for fraud? 
 
The issue with these hypotheticals is in determining whether 
plaintiffs can successfully plead a strong inference of scienter, 
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
against the corporation without being able to plead that any 
specific individual within the corporation had scienter.  
Traditionally, a plaintiff can successfully plead that a corporation 
has scienter when the scienter of an individual within the 
company can be imputed to the corporation.1  Recently, however, 
alternate theories have arisen to impute scienter to a corporation 
without inculpating an individual employee.  One of them is 
collective scienter, which is the subject of this Note. 
This Note argues that the correct approach to imputing 
scienter to a corporation by means of the collective scienter 
theory is through the absurdity analysis taken by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Part I of this 
Note reviews the Securities Exchange Act, which gave rise to the 
private right of action in securities fraud litigation.  Part I also 
discusses United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
private right of action.  Furthermore, Part I lays out the 
framework of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”).  PSLRA enacted a variety of procedural reforms in 
securities litigation in an attempt to curb frivolous litigation.2  
Part I focuses on the changes that PSLRA caused in securities 
litigation and the congressional intent behind those changes. 
Part II examines the current split of authority among the 
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuits over the extent, if any, that collective scienter should be 
used in pleading that a corporation has scienter.  One approach 
is that of the Fifth Circuit, which considers collective scienter to 
contradict common law fraud principles.3  The only way to 
impute liability to a corporation is to look at the required state of 
1 See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 
366 (5th Cir. 2004). 
2 See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 914 (2003). 
3 Southland Sec. Corp., 365 F.3d at 366 (rejecting the use of collective scienter 
as inconsistent with common law fraud principles). 
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mind of an individual corporate official.4  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit takes a similar 
approach, holding that collective scienter is not consistent with 
PSLRA’s requirement that scienter be pled with particularity.5 
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit has adopted a theory of 
collective scienter.6  It allows plaintiffs to plead that the 
corporation has scienter by pairing the statements of the 
company to an individual who knew the statements were false, 
even though it was not the same person who made the 
statements.7 
The last approach, developed by the Seventh Circuit, has 
been called the “absurdity analysis.”8  This analysis allows for a 
limited version of collective scienter.9  Under this analysis, a 
complaint can adequately plead scienter on the part of the 
corporation without imputing it to a specific individual if the 
statement made by the corporation is so dramatic that a 
corporate official must have known it was false.10 
Finally, Part III argues that the correct standard for 
permitting collective scienter is the one presented by the Seventh 
Circuit.  While many of the purer forms of collective scienter are 
problematic under the heightened pleading standards enacted by 
PSLRA, an all-out ban on collective scienter disregards the 
practical difficulties in being able to effectively impute scienter 
prior to discovery.11 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach is consistent with Congress’s 
intent in enacting PSLRA and the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence with regard to securities litigation.12  Furthermore, 
it is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, Inc. 
4 Id. 
5 Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1018 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that collective scienter did not satisfy the particularity requirement of 
PSLRA). 
6 City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 685 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (allowing plaintiffs to use a theory of collective scienter to satisfy the 
pleading requirements of the PSLRA). 
7 Id. 
8 See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 One reform of PSLRA was to halt discovery during a motion to dismiss. 
Therefore, plaintiffs only have the tools at hand available to them when alleging 
scienter. 
12 See infra Part I.B. 
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v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.13  In Tellabs, the Court reiterated 
the heightened pleading standard for scienter required to survive 
a motion to dismiss.14  The Seventh Circuit’s approach maintains 
this heightened pleading standard that both the Supreme Court 
and Congress have unequivocally sustained.  Moreover, the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach allows courts to take a common sense 
perspective in the scienter analysis.15 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress enacted the 
Securities Exchange Act of 193416 (“Exchange Act”).  The 
Exchange Act was intended to be a method of regulating the 
trade of securities in order to protect investors from fraud.17  To 
fulfill its congressional mandate, the Exchange Act created the 
Securities Exchange Commission18 (“SEC”). The SEC was given 
broad authority to regulate the securities industry, including the 
ability to promulgate rules under the Exchange Act.19  Rule 10b-5 
13 551 U.S. 308 (2007); see infra Part I.C. 
14 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324. 
15 See S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In 
assessing the allegations holistically as required by Tellabs, the federal courts 
certainly need not close their eyes to circumstances that are probative of scienter 
viewed with a practical and common-sense perspective.”). 
16 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
17 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (“The 1934 Act was 
intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices 
through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-
counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose 
stock is listed on national securities exchanges.”); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975) (“The Securities Exchange Act of 
1943 . . . provide[d] for the regulation of securities exchanges . . . to prevent 
inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets . . . .”); Browning 
Jeffries, The Implications of Janus on Issuer Liability in Jurisdictions Rejecting 
Collective Scienter, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 491, 498 (2013). 
18 See Jeffries, supra note 17; The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933 (last 
modified Oct. 1, 2013). 
19 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) gave the SEC broad 
powers including the power to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, 
transfer agents, and clearing agents. The SEC was given the power to regulate 
various securities exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange and the 
NASDAQ. Furthermore, the Exchange Act gives the SEC disciplinary powers over 
certain types of conduct that the Exchange Act prohibits such as fraud and deceptive 
practices. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 18. 
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of the Exchange Act, promulgated in 1948, is a “broad antifraud 
provision that essentially prohibits all fraud in connection with 
the purchase or sale of securities.”20  Rule 10b-5 makes it 
unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors.”21  Rule 10b-5 
was a hastily created and broadly defined rule.22  Because of this 
broad definition, Rule 10b-5 has grown exponentially through 
judicial activism.  As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, “a judicial 
oak . . . has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”23 
Among the regulatory powers that the Exchange Act granted 
the SEC was the power to bring enforcement actions against 
violators of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.24  While the rule does 
not mention any private right of action for violations of the 
provisions, district courts began to recognize an implied private 
right of action early on.25  The Supreme Court, two decades 
following the implementation of the act, confirmed this private 
right of action.26 
20 Justin Marocco, When Will It Finally End: The Effectiveness of the Rule 10b-5 
Private Action as a Fraud-Deterrence Mechanism Post-Janus, 73 LA. L. REV. 633, 633 
(2013). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (implementing section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
22 Marocco, supra note 20 (“I wasted no time; I got some people in, we drafted a 
rule, we presented it to the Commission, and, without any hesitation, the 
Commission tossed the paper on the table saying they were in favor of it. One 
Commission member said, ‘Well, we’re against fraud, aren’t we?’ So, before the sun 
was down, we had the rule that is now Rule 10b-5” (quoting Milton V. Freeman, 
Colloquium Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S1–S2 (1993))). 
23 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
24 See supra note 19 (describing the regulatory powers of the SEC). 
25 See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 499 (describing the jurisprudence leading to the 
recognition of the private right of action); see, e.g., Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. 
Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (recognizing an implied private right of action in the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
26 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) 
(“Hence we do not read § 10(b) as narrowly as the Court of Appeals; it is not ‘limited 
to preserving the integrity of the securities markets,’ though that purpose is 
included. Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. Since 
there was a ‘sale’ of a security and since fraud was used ‘in connection with’ it, there 
is redress under § 10(b), whatever might be available as a remedy under state law.” 
(quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 361 (2d 
Cir. 1970))); see also Jeffries, supra note 17, at 499. 
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For a private litigant to establish a Rule 10b-5 claim, the 
plaintiff must prove (a) a material misrepresentation or omission 
made by the defendant, (b) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and purchase or sale of a security, 
(c) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, (d) economic 
loss, (e) loss causation, and (f) scienter.27  Satisfying the scienter 
element is the focus of this Note. 
B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) 
Congress has also made it increasingly difficult for private 
individuals to bring private securities claims.  Congress was 
concerned that an unchecked private right of action could lead to 
a host of frivolous actions which would undermine the capital 
markets and harm the entire economy.28  Therefore, in 1995, 
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”). 
Congressional reports prior to the enactment of the PSLRA 
clearly demonstrate the concerns that Congress had with an 
unchecked private right of action.29  Left unchecked, private 
rights actions can lead to frivolous suits and also impose 
substantial burdens on law abiding companies.30  These 
“nuisance filings” were forcing innocent companies to pay either 
exorbitant attorney fees or even larger settlements.31  This, in 
turn, harms investors, “the very people that securities actions are 
supposed to protect.”32 
At the same time, however, Congress also recognized the 
importance that private rights of action played in enforcing 
federal securities litigation.33  Along with SEC civil and criminal 
27 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 
(2008). 
28 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730–31; see also Patrick Berarducci &, Larry J. Obhof, Supreme 
Court Clarifies Scienter Pleadings, 17 BUS. L. TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 10. 
29 H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730–31 
(noting that many security suits targeted deep pocket defendants without regard to 
their actual culpability). 
30 MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER THE PSLRA § 1.01(A), at 
1-10–11 (2012). 
31 See Berarducci & Obhof, supra note 28. 
32 Id. (describing many of the costs of frivolous securities litigation including the 
frustration of normal business activities along with expensive litigation). 
33 H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730–31 
(“The private securities litigation system is too important to the integrity of 
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enforcement actions, the private right of action is an effective tool 
in enforcing federal securities litigation.34  The private right of 
action provides investors with an independent avenue of redress 
without relying on federal authorities such as the SEC to take 
action.35  Furthermore, the private right of action enhances 
confidence in the capital markets by offering another element of 
deterrence to corporate officers before perpetrating a fraud.36 
PSLRA attempted to balance these two opposing goals when 
overhauling the procedural requirements for bringing a 
securities fraud claim.37 PSLRA was intended to address a 
variety of problems with securities litigation by instituting 
“procedural hurdles” to dissuade nonmeritorious litigation.38  
PSLRA substantially altered securities litigation with one 
principle change being the pleading standards.39  PSLRA enacted 
a heightened pleading standard for plaintiffs claiming securities 
fraud.40 
 
American capital markets to allow this system to be undermined by those who seek 
to line their own pockets by bringing abusive and meritless suits. Private securities 
litigation is an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their 
losses without having to rely upon government action. Such private lawsuits 
promote public and global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter 
wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and 
others properly perform their jobs. This legislation seeks to return the securities 
litigation system to that high standard.”). 
34 See id. at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730; PERINO, supra note 30, 
at 1-6–7 (“Congress expressly adopted the view long espoused by courts, the SEC, 
and plaintiff’s class action attorneys that ‘[p]rivate securities litigation is an 
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without 
having to rely upon government action.’ ” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)); 
see also, Berarducci & Obhof, supra note 28. (recognizing the importance of the 
private right of action in deterring fraud and other violations).  
35 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730. 
36 See id. 
37 PERINO, supra note 30, at 1-6 (“Congress viewed itself as walking a fine line 
between promoting confidence in the fairness of the litigation system and promoting 
confidence in the fairness of the capital markets.”). 
38 See Perino, supra note 2 (stating one of Congress’s primary goals as reducing 
the costs that securities class actions impose on the capital markets by discourage 
the filing of nonmeritorious suits); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007). 
39 Other changes included procedures for appointment of lead plaintiffs and lead 
counsel, limitations on damages and attorney fees, a statutory safe harbor for 
forward looking statements, a stay of discovery pending a motion to dismiss, and 
mandatory sanctions for frivolous lawsuits. Berarducci & Obhof, supra note 28. 
40 See 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
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Before PSLRA, plaintiffs were required to plead fraud in 
accordance with Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead the facts with 
particularity.41  PSLRA raised that standard by requiring 
plaintiffs to plead falsity and scienter with particularity.42 
PSLRA first requires that each allegedly false or misleading 
statement must be pled “with particularity.”43  Second, it requires 
that a complaint must “state with particularity facts giving rise 
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind.”44  A strong inference has been defined as one that 
a reasonable person would deem cogent and at least as 
compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the 
facts alleged.45 
This heightened pleading standard has made it difficult for 
plaintiffs to ever reach the discovery stage.46  Therefore, in order 
to satisfy these pleading requirements, a variety of pleading 
theories have arisen.47  One such theory is collective scienter. 
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Private Rights of Action 
The Supreme Court, beginning in the early 1990s, decided a 
series of cases that drastically rolled back the effectiveness of the 
private right of action.  Along with the aforementioned 
congressional legislation the ability of private investors to 
succeed in bringing causes of action under Rule 10b-5 has been 
seriously curtailed. 
In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver,48 the Supreme Court took the first swing of the axe at the 
“judicial oak.”  Following the promulgation of Rule 10b-5, lower 
courts interpreted the rule liberally, allowing plaintiffs to pursue 
both primary and secondary actors.49  Plaintiffs were able to 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
42 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b). 
43 § 78u-4(b)(1). 
44 § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). 
45 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007). 
46 See Heather F. Crow, Riding the Fence on Collective Scienter: Allowing 
Plaintiffs To Clear the PSLRA Pleading Hurdle, 71 LA. L. REV. 313, 320 (2010). 
47 See generally PERINO, supra note 30. 
48 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
49 David J. Baum, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: Private Aiding and 
Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1817, 
1822–24 (1995) (documenting the rise of aiding and abetting liability prior to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Central Bank). 
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succeed against a defendant who, while not the primary violator, 
was engaged in preparation or other activity that helped the 
primary violators perpetrate the fraud;50 this was known as 
aiding and abetting liability.51  From the enactment of the 
Rule10b-5 until 1994, every federal circuit court agreed that 
plaintiffs were able to succeed against secondary violators in this 
way.52  Because of this, private plaintiffs were able to successfully 
assert claims against a variety of secondary actors, including 
lawyers and accountants.53 
In 1994, the Supreme Court overruled thirty years of 
precedent by holding that private litigants could not utilize an 
aiding and abetting theory of liability under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.54  The Court strictly interpreted the language of 
section 10(b) to find that private causes of action do not impose 
aiding-and-abetting liability.55  While the Court did not rule on 
aiding and abetting liability with regards to SEC enforcement 
actions, Congress took the steps to expressly authorize SEC 
enforcement actions for aiding and abetting liability.56  Notably, 
Congress did not extend aider and abettor liability to the private 
right of action.57 
Following the Court’s ruling in Central Bank, the circuit 
courts adopted various methods for imputing secondary actor 
liability without using aiding and abetting violations as the 
foundation of the claim.  One such standard was known as 
“scheme liability.”58  Scheme liability uses Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) 
50 Id. 
51 See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 500. 
52 See id. at 499–500; see also Baum, supra note 49, at 1824 n.47 (listing the 
circuit cases that have upheld aider and abettor liability). 
53 Baum, supra note 49, at 1819. 
54 See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 177–78 (1994) (holding that since the statute does not provide for aiding 
and abetting liability, the Court “cannot amend the statute to create liability for acts 
that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of the 
statute.”); see also Baum, supra note 49, at 1835. 
55 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177–78. 
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012) (“[A]ny person that knowingly or recklessly 
provides substantial assistance to another person . . . shall be deemed to be in 
violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance 
is provided.”). 
57 See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 501. Congress, in section 20(e) of the Exchange 
Act, expressly authorized the SEC to bring enforcement actions based on aiding and 
abetting liability; however Congress did not extend the same protection to private 
litigants. 
58 Id. at 502. 
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instead of Rule 10b-5(b).59  Using these two sections, plaintiffs 
had found a loophole to get around the Court’s ruling in Central 
Bank.60  Courts would find defendants liable as part of a 
fraudulent scheme, as long as the scheme encompassed conduct 
beyond a misrepresentation or omission.61  This began a broad 
interpretation of scheme liability which incorporated many 
secondary actors into the liability fold. 
However, once again, as the judicial oak began to grow, the 
Supreme Court stepped in to prune it.  In Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,62 the Court narrowed 
the application of scheme liability by focusing on the reliance 
element of Rule 10b-5.63  The Court held that the plaintiff failed 
to establish the element of reliance in its Rule 10b-5 claim.64  The 
Court stated the secondary actors had no duty to disclose and no 
member of the investing public had knowledge of the deceptive 
acts.65  Therefore, to use scheme liability to impute liability to the 
secondary actors was an “indirect chain,” which the Court found 
“too remote for liability.”66 
While the Court narrowed down a formerly expansive 
interpretation of scheme liability, it did not extinguish scheme 
liability entirely.  In Stoneridge, as is mentioned above, the Court 
issued a narrow holding which focused only on the issue of 
reliance.67  The holding did not speak to the larger issue of 
whether the defendant has to actually make the statement to be 
held liable.  The Court explicitly said that the rejection of scheme 
liability does not necessarily make all secondary actors immune 
59 Under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c), defendants who use a “device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud” may be liable for securities fraud. After Central Bank, plaintiffs began 
using these sections to inculpate secondary actors for misrepresentations made by 
primary violators of § 10b. In doing so, they created a type of aider and abettor 
liability outside of Rule 10b-5(b), which the Court struck down in Central Bank. See 
BRENT A. OLSON, 2 PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS: GOVERNANCE & REG. § 11:9 
(2015). 
60 See Marocco, supra note 20, at 640. 
61 See OLSON, supra note 59. Under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c) there must be an 
inherently deceptive act that is distinct from an alleged misstatement. A claim 
under “scheme liability” cannot be made where the only claim alleged is 
misrepresentation or omission. 
62 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
63 Id. at 159. 
64 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
65 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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from private suit.68  The Court reiterated the holding of Central 
Bank, that the private right of action covers secondary actors 
who commit primary violations.69 
The Supreme Court altered the securities litigation 
landscape once again in 2007 with Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues 
& Rights, Ltd.70  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, the 
circuits were split on what constituted a “strong inference of 
scienter” as required by the PSLRA.  Specifically, the circuits 
were split over what plaintiffs were required to plead to survive a 
motion for summary judgment.  In Tellabs, the Court defined 
what it meant to plead a “strong inference.”71  The Court defined 
this as an inference of scienter that is at least as likely as any 
plausible opposing inference.72  While the Court adopted a strict 
definition of strong inference, the Court did not adopt the 
strictest.73  The Court stated that the inference must be more 
than merely plausible; it did not require that it was the strongest 
inference.74 
Along with defining the strong inference of scienter, the 
Court also instructed courts to view allegations collectively.75  
The Court stated that courts must consider the complaint in its 
entirety.76  The question is not whether any individual allegation 
meets the strong inference of scienter standard but whether the 
allegations collectively raise a strong inference of scienter.77 
 
68 Id. at 166. 
69 Id. 
70 551 U.S. 308 (2007). See generally Melissa Gilbert, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd.—How the Ruling Will Affect Securities Litigation, 3 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 55 (2008) (discussing the potential effects of the Tellabs 
decision on securities litigation). 
71 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 329. Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority’s definition of “strong 
inference” because it did not require the most plausible inference. In his 
concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that “the test should be whether the inference of 
scienter (if any) is more plausible that the inference of innocence.” This would be the 
normal meaning of the phrase “strong inference” that Congress employed. Id. 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
75 Id. at 326 (majority opinion). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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Finally, the Supreme Court in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. 
First Derivative Traders78 defined what it means to make a 
statement under Rule 10b-5.79  The Court narrowly interpreted 
the word “maker” for Rule 10b-5 purposes as “the person or 
entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its 
content and whether and how to communicate it.”80  The Court 
further stated that one who merely prepares a statement for 
someone is not its maker.81  In doing so, the Court reaffirmed 
that the private right of action should be given a narrow scope.82 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s recent history has shown a 
trend of narrowing private causes of action and liability in 
securities litigation under Rule 10b-5.  The Court has 
consistently narrowed whom investors can attempt to attach 
liability to and the methods through which investors attempt to 
attach liability.  It is evident that the Supreme Court is intent on 
trimming the judicial oak but is unwilling to completely uproot it. 
D. Collective Scienter 
It is generally accepted that corporations can act with 
scienter when an authorized agent makes a false statement, 
knowing that the statement is false.83  Courts have adopted 
respondeat superior-type doctrines to impute knowledge from an 
agent to the corporation in order to hold the corporation liable for 
securities fraud.84  It is universally accepted that the simplest 
way to raise an inference of scienter for a corporate defendant is 
to plead that an individual defendant, acting as an agent of the 
corporation, acted with scienter.85  This method borrows from 
common law respondeat superior doctrines and agency 
principles.86 
78 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
79 Id. at 2301. 
80 Id. at 2302. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 2303. 
83 See Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective Scienter in SEC 
Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2009). 
84 Id. 
85 Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2008). 
86 See Kevin M. O’Riordan, Clear Support or Cause for Suspicion? A Critique of 
Collective Scienter in Securities Litigation, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1596, 1604 (2007) 
(explaining respondeat superior holds an employer liable for an employee’s or 
agent’s wrongful acts if those acts are committed within the scope of employment). 
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Courts have disagreed, however, over whether plaintiffs can 
raise a strong inference that a corporation has scienter without 
pleading scienter to an individual defendant.  The theory through 
which plaintiffs can raise the strong inference that a corporation 
has scienter without inculpating an individual defendant is 
known as collective scienter.87  Collective scienter has taken a 
variety of forms.88  Generally, collective scienter “permits the 
aggregation of one person’s misstatement with the intent of 
another in a single pleading in order to attribute an allegation of 
scienter to the corporation, rather than pinpoint a single actor 
who intentionally misspoke.”89 
Collective scienter is often broken down into two categories: 
strong and weak collective scienter.90  The strong version allows 
plaintiffs to “allege scienter on the part of a corporate defendant 
without pleading scienter as to any particular employee.”91  This 
is because the corporation is deemed to have a state of mind 
completely separate from any of its employees.92 The knowledge 
deemed corporate knowledge is “an undifferentiated aggregation 
of its employees’ knowledge.”93 
The weak version of collective scienter compares the 
knowledge of one corporate employee to the statements of 
another.94  The weak version allows a plaintiff to successfully 
plead corporate scienter if the plaintiff alleges that a member of 
management made a false statement when another employee 
knew that statement to be false.95  The weak version of collective 
scienter allows a plaintiff to mix and match an employee who is 
the speaker with an employee who knows the statement was 
false.  For example, drawing from Scenario B, the weak version 
of collective scienter would allow the statements made by the 
CEO to be matched with the janitor’s knowledge of the 
statement’s falsity to satisfy the scienter standard. 
87 Id. at 1605. 
88 Id. at 1606–07. 
89 See Crow, supra note 46 at 314. 
90 See MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 24.55 (2014); 
see also Bondi, supra note 83 at 7. 
91 See Bondi, supra note 83 at 10. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 12–13. 
95 Id. 
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. Fifth Circuit Rejects Collective Scienter on Common Law 
Fraud Grounds 
The Fifth Circuit has rejected the concept of collective 
scienter in its entirety on the ground that it is incompatible with 
common law fraud concepts.96  In Southland  Securities Corp. v. 
INSpire Insurance Solutions Inc.,97 the defendant, INSpire, was a 
software service provider that was alleged to have made a variety 
of misrepresentations,98 including the release of software with 
design flaws and the inflation of earning statements.99 
The Fifth Circuit held that, for a plaintiff to raise a strong 
inference that a corporation acted with scienter, the court must 
“look to the state of mind of the individual corporate official or 
officials who make or issue the statement.”100  It is insufficient to 
look “generally to the collective knowledge of all the corporation’s 
officers and employees acquired in the course of their 
employment.”101  The act of making the statement and the state 
of mind must intersect with a single individual.102 
The court relied on common law fraud concepts to reach its 
conclusion.103 In common law fraud actions, the subjective state 
of mind must exist in the individual making the misstatement.104  
In other words, the person who makes the misstatement must 
also be the one who intended to deceive.  Therefore, in a Rule 
10b-5 action, the misstatement must be made by the same 
individual who acted with scienter.105 
The plaintiffs in Southland failed to identify any INSpire 
director, officer, or employee who acted with scienter in the 
making or issuing of any statements.106  Without a collective 
scienter theory at the plaintiffs’ disposal, and since the plaintiffs 
96 Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th 
Cir. 2004). 
97 365 F.3d 353. 
98 Id. at 360–61. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 366. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 367. 
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could not show any intersection of scienter and misstatement, the 
plaintiffs failed to raise a strong inference of scienter on the part 
of the corporation.107 
B. Eleventh Circuit Rejects Collective Scienter as Incompatible 
with PSLRA 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected collective scienter, by 
emphasizing its incompatibility with the PSLRA.108  In two 
separate cases, the Eleventh Circuit held that scienter must be 
pled specifically to each defendant.109  In Phillips v.  
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,110 the court held that scienter must be 
found with respect to each defendant and with respect to each 
alleged violation of the statute.111  The court relied on the “plain 
meaning” of the PSLRA to come to its conclusion.112  The PSLRA 
uses the singular term “the defendant” with respect to alleging 
scienter.113  It requires that plaintiffs, “with respect to each act or 
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind.”114  For this reason the court 
concluded that scienter must be pled with particularity to each 
defendant and that it would be improper to aggregate the 
knowledge of several defendants when alleging a strong inference 
of scienter.115  Therefore, the court held that pleadings that relied 
on collective scienter would not survive summary judgment. 
Two years later, the court applied the same reasoning in 
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp.,116 to strike down a theory of weak 
collective scienter.117  There, the court held that the plaintiffs 
failed to plead scienter with sufficient particularity because they 
did not allege that the officer who signed a Sarbanes-Oxley  
 
107 Id. at 367–68. 
108 Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 2004). 
109 See Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1265 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Phillips, 374 F.3d at 1017–18. 
110 374 F.3d 1015. 
111 Id. at 1017–18. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1018 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2) (2012)). 
115 Id. at 1017–18. 
116 466 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2006). 
117 Id. at 1265. 
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certificate was the same one who was aware of the financial 
misrepresentation.118  The language of the PSLRA precluded the 
plaintiffs from utilizing a theory of collective scienter.119 
C. The Sixth Circuit Accepts Collective Scienter 
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit has embraced a theory of 
collective scienter.120  In City of Monroe Employees Retirement 
System v. Bridgestone Corp.,121 Bridgestone, a tire company, had 
safety problems with its tires.122  Firestone is a subsidiary of 
Bridgestone operating in the United States.  Shareholders sued 
Bridgestone and Firestone, alleging several public 
misrepresentations about the safety and performance of their 
tires.123  Firestone was well aware of many of the safety problems 
because of internal reports that demonstrated the tires’ safety 
problems.124  Other evidence that the defendants were aware of 
the defects in their products included a settlement with an 
insurance company.125  Venezuela and the State of Arizona, 
furthermore, had both notified Firestone of issues they were 
having with the tires.126 
While Firestone was aware of all this information, the CEO 
of the company had never made any statements concerning the 
safety of the tires.127  Therefore, the plaintiffs could not match the 
statements to anyone with knowledge of their falsity.  The court, 
however, permitted the plaintiffs to plead a theory of collective 
scienter.128  The plaintiffs aggregated the misleading corporate 
statements with the knowledge of the CEO and the pleading 
survived the motion to dismiss.129 
118 Id. at 1266. 
119 Id. 
120 City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 685–86 
(6th Cir. 2005). 
121 399 F.3d 651. 
122 Id. at 656–57. 
123 Id. at 663–64. 
124 Id. at 657. 
125 Id. at 658. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 690. 
128 Id.at 690–91. 
129 Id. 
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D. The Supreme Court Clarifies the Scienter Standard—Tellabs 
v. Makor Issues & Rights 
After years of disagreement among the circuit courts 
regarding what constituted a strong inference of scienter, the 
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the standard in 2007.130  On 
appeal from the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court defined a 
strong inference of scienter and offered an analytical framework 
for courts to employ when determining whether it exists.  The 
Court defined a strong inference of scienter as one that is “at 
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw 
from the facts alleged.”131 
Furthermore, the Court also shed light on how courts should 
analyze scienter allegations.132  Many circuits took a very 
individualized approach to determining whether plaintiffs 
satisfied the pleading standard.  The Supreme Court, however, 
cautioned that it is not the court’s job “to scrutinize each 
allegation in isolation but to assess all the allegations 
holistically.”133  The Court instructed reviewing courts to ask this 
question:  “When the allegations are accepted as true and taken 
collectively, would a reasonable person deem the inference of 
scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference?”134  This 
holistic analysis is inherently a comparative one.135  In order to 
determine the strength of an inference, it is necessary to evaluate 
opposing inferences.136  The inference of scienter does not need to 
be irrefutable.137  It must, however, be at least as cogent as the 
nonculpable explanations.138 
Tellabs has the potential to affect collective scienter in two 
ways.  First, it addresses whether a strong inference, as defined 
by the Court, can be raised without identifying an individual who 
both made the statement and acted with the requisite state of 
mind.  Second, it requires that allegations be reviewed  
 
 
130 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–24 (2007). 
131 Id. at 324. 
132 Id. at 326. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 323. 
136 Id. at 323–24. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
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holistically instead of individually.  By requiring a holistic view 
of scienter allegations, the Court is instructing lower courts to 
take a more common sense approach to allegations.139 
E. Tellabs on Remand (“Tellabs II”) 
On remand, the Seventh Circuit applied the Supreme 
Court’s definition of strong inference and also addressed the 
issue of collective scienter.140  In discussing collective scienter, 
the court seemingly adopted the Fifth Circuit’s approach in 
Southland.141  The court stated that, in order to establish 
corporate liability for a Rule 10b-5 violation, the plaintiff must 
plead scienter by looking at the state of mind of the individual 
corporate official.142  It is, therefore, not sufficient to look 
generally to the collective knowledge of all the corporation’s 
officers and employees.  At first glance, it appears that the 
Seventh Circuit sounded the death knell of collective scienter. 
However, the court did not close the door on collective 
scienter entirely.  The court went on to proffer a hypothetical 
which breathes life back into collective scienter.  The court stated 
that a strong inference of scienter can be pled without naming a 
specific corporate individual: 
Suppose General Motors announced that it had sold one million 
SUVs in 2006, and the actual number was zero.  There would be 
a strong inference of corporate scienter, since so dramatic an 
announcement would have been approved by corporate officials 
sufficiently knowledgeable about the company to know that the 
announcement was false.143 
This analysis has become known as the “absurdity analysis.” 
The absurdity analysis does not fit squarely into either the 
strong or weak versions of collective scienter; the analysis is a 
third, very limited, category of collective scienter.  This analysis 
allows for the imputation of scienter to the corporation, outside of 
the traditional respondeat superior type methods. 
139 See S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008). 
140 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 704 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
141 Id. at 708. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 710. 
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F. In the Wake of Tellabs 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,144 and the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Tellabs II, the circuit courts have not offered definitive views 
of collective scienter.  The general trend among the circuits has 
been to acknowledge that collective scienter is possible, but to 
leave the question of how to plead it unanswered. 
1. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit in Glazer Capital Management, LP v. 
Magistri,145 adopted much of the Seventh Circuit’s approach in 
Tellabs II.  In Glazer, a company, InVision, announced that it 
had entered into a merger agreement with General Electric.146  
The merger agreement was a sixty-page document signed by the 
CEO and COO of InVision.147  Several months later, InVision 
released a press release which announced possible violations of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.148  This announcement put the 
merger in jeopardy, and caused stock prices to plunge.149 
The plaintiffs alleged scienter on the part of InVision based 
on a theory of collective scienter.150  The plaintiffs alleged that, 
since the merger agreement contained statements assuring 
compliance with all laws, the company knowingly made false 
statements.151  The court found that the plaintiffs did not 
adequately plead scienter.152  Since the CEO made the 
statements, the plaintiffs were required to plead scienter with 
respect to him;153 another employee’s knowledge of the 
misstatement was insufficient.154 
The court, however, recognized that collective scienter may 
still be possible because it was possible to raise the required 
inference of scienter with regard to a corporate defendant 
144 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007). 
145 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008). 
146 Id. at 739. 
147 Id. at 739–40. 
148 Id. at 739. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 743. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 745. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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without doing so with regard to a specific individual.155  It further 
cited the Seventh Circuit’s hypothetical in Tellabs II as one 
instance where a corporation could be held liable through a 
theory of collective scienter.156  The court stated that “there could 
be circumstances in which a company’s public statements were so 
important and so dramatically false that they would create a 
strong inference that at least some corporate officials knew of the 
falsity upon publication.”157 
However, the court noted that much of its analysis was dicta, 
because the facts presented by Glazer were different than the 
hypothetical in Tellabs II.158  The court held that, under these 
facts, the plaintiffs were required to plead that an individual 
acted with scienter.159  To allow the plaintiffs to circumvent the 
individualized pleading requirement under a collective scienter 
theory would allow the plaintiffs to satisfy the scienter pleading 
standard by showing any employee at InVision had knowledge of 
the violation.160  The court held that this would be inconsistent 
with the pleading requirements of PSLRA.161  However, the court 
left open the question whether any circumstances exist where a 
theory of collective sceinter would be proper.162 
2. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit’s approach to collective scienter mirrors 
that of the Ninth Circuit.  The Second Circuit, in Teamsters Local 
445 Freight Division Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc.,163 held 
that while the easiest way to raise this inference is to plead 
scienter to an individual defendant, it was not the only way.164  
The court acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit’s absurdity 
analysis was an alternate way to raise a strong inference of 
scienter and, therefore, the Second Circuit implicitly adopted a 
version of collective scienter.165 
155 Id. at 744. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 745. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008). 
164 Id. at 195. 
165 Id. at 195–96. 
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In Dynex, the plaintiff had purchased asset-backed securities 
that were secured by mortgage loans sold by the defendant, 
Dynex, and its subsidiary, Merit Securities.166  After the bonds 
were issued, an increasing number of borrowers defaulted on 
their mortgages which caused the value of collateral to decline as 
well as substantial losses for investors.167  The defendant later 
disclosed that it had understated repossession rates on the 
collateral, and plaintiffs filed an action for securities fraud.168  
The plaintiffs named the principal executive officer of Dynex and 
the CEO of Merit as defendants, along with the corporate 
defendants Dynex and Merit.169  While the court held that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint was insufficient to raise a strong inference of 
scienter, the court did not foreclose on the possibility of pleading 
a strong inference of scienter through the collective scienter 
method.170 
3.  United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
Struggles with Tellabs 
In City of Roseville Employees’ Retirement System v. Horizon 
Lines, Inc.,171 the Third Circuit approved a method of imputing 
liability to a corporation by pleading scienter to a specific 
individual within the company.  In discussing collective scienter, 
like the Ninth and Second Circuit, the court implied an 
acceptance of the hypothetical presented in Tellabs II.172  
Ultimately, though, the court decided that the facts presented did 
not raise an issue akin to the absurdity analysis.173  Therefore the 
court declined to decide whether any of the approaches of 
collective scienter were viable pleading methods in the Third 
Circuit.174 
The dissent, however, offered a strong critique of the 
majority’s analysis.  Specifically the dissent took issue with the 
court’s individualistic approach to viewing the allegations.175  The 
166 Id. at 192. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 193. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 196. 
171 442 F. App’x 672 (3d Cir. 2011). 
172 Id. at 676–77. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 678 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
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dissent noted that “reviewing each allegation individually before 
reviewing them holistically risks losing the forest for the 
trees.”176  After conducting a holistic review of the allegations 
presented the dissenting opinion found that defendants pled 
sufficient facts to show that senior executives made false 
statements with scienter.177  Therefore, the plaintiffs satisfied the 
most basic way to impute liability to a corporation.178  Once 
again, however, the dissent found it unnecessary to delve further 
into collective scienter, as the facts presented did not call for it.179 
The Tellabs decision, which was intended to promote 
uniformity among scienter pleading, has had only a limited 
impact on the theory of collective scienter.180  Some courts have 
analyzed how the newly defined “strong inference” of scienter 
would affect collective scienter, but few courts have considered 
the effects that a holistic analysis would have on pleading 
scienter through the collective scienter theory.181  In Rahman v. 
Kid Brands, Inc.,182 the District Court of New Jersey analyzed 
the circuit split in light of the strong inference requirement of 
Tellabs and concluded that collective scienter was still a viable 
theory, as long as it was confined to the limits outlined in the 
hypothetical from Tellabs II.183  The court stated that “it may be 
possible to plead [collective] scienter against a corporation 
[but] . . . the alleged wrongdoing to so assert collective scienter 
would need be ‘extraordinary.’ ”184 
Rahman is also one of the few cases that begins to analyze 
how a holistic approach to the scienter analysis impacts collective 
scienter.  While the court ultimately held that plaintiffs failed to 
plead sufficient indicia of scienter for the court to apply collective 
scienter, the court offered a glimpse of what would be sufficient.  
The plaintiffs alleged that, since the company was issued a 
warning because of its fraudulent import practices, they satisfied 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 680. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 See, e.g., Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 
2008) (leaving the possibility of collective scienter as an open issue). 
181 See, e.g., City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys., 442 F. App’x at 678 (Ambro, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for failing to review the allegations 
holistically). 
182 No. 11-1624 (JLL), 2012 WL 762311 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2012). 
183 Id. at *20–21. 
184 Id. at *20 (quoting City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys., 442 F. App’x at 676). 
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the collective scienter pleading requirement through a totality of 
the circumstances test.185  The court, however, disagreed.  The 
court stated that a single red flag alerting the board to possible 
misconduct was insufficient to plead collective scienter.186  The 
amended complaint did not allege the pervasiveness of the 
violations or whether executive officers would have been alerted 
of them.187 
III. THE CORRECT STANDARD: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S 
“ABSURDITY ANALYSIS” 
The Seventh Circuit approach is consistent with the 
language and congressional intent behind PSLRA.  Furthermore, 
it is also consistent with both the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on the private right of action generally as well as the Court’s 
interpretation of the scienter pleading standard in Tellabs. 
A. Absurdity Analysis Is Consistent with the Twin Aims of 
PSLRA 
The Seventh Circuit’s absurdity analysis is consistent with 
Congress’s intent in enacting PSLRA.188  The purpose of PSLRA 
was to dissuade frivolous litigation, while preserving meritorious 
claims.189  Permitting a narrow version of collective scienter 
under the Seventh Circuit’s approach will accomplish both of 
these goals.190 
Allowing collective scienter only in instances where it would 
be absurd for corporate officials not to be aware of the 
misstatements maintains a high bar for pleading standards.  One 
of the main critiques of collective scienter is that it will allow 
plaintiffs to circumvent the heightened pleading standard and 
conduct a “fishing expedition” in discovery.191  This would impose 
many of the costs that PSLRA had intended to eliminate.  
Collective scienter under the absurdity analysis would not  
 
 
185 Id. at *22. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 See supra part III.A. 
189 See supra part I.B. 
190 See supra part III.A. 
191 See PERINO, supra note 30, at 1-8. 
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encounter this problem.  Since the absurdity analysis is limited 
to extraordinary situations, a flood of plaintiffs would not 
overcome the pleading hurdles. 
Furthermore, accepting the absurdity analysis would do 
away with the distinction between strong and weak collective 
scienter and many of the problems that arise with the two 
theories.  Hypothetical B, which matched the janitor’s knowledge 
of falsity with the CEO’s statement, is the classic example of 
weak collective scienter.  This example demonstrates the 
potential ridiculous results that would arise from mixing and 
matching one person’s state of mind with another’s statement.192  
Further, the critique also highlights the problem that weak 
collective scienter does not define what level of employee can be 
used in the analysis.193  There is no characterization of whether 
the employees must be corporate officers or management-level 
employees, or whether the employee can extend all the way down 
to the janitor’s office. 
The absurdity analysis is not shackled by the same critiques 
of weak collective scienter.  First, there is no mixing and 
matching of one person’s state of mind and another person’s 
statement.  Instead, the analysis rests upon the assumption that 
there are some statements that are so dramatic, so important to 
the company, that it is safe to assume that at least one corporate 
official had the requisite state of mind.  Second, there is no 
danger of relying on a low level employee to impute liability to 
the corporation.  The analysis limits the assumption to corporate 
officials.  The absurdity analysis does not allow for one janitor to 
impute liability to the entire corporation. 
The critique of strong collective scienter is presented in 
Scenario C.  The critique centers on business efficiency.  To 
ensure the complete integration of all information across 
international offices would be an unreasonable burden.  It would 
slow day-to-day business operations and would force corporations 
to undertake inefficient compliance monitoring. 
192 Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th 
Cir. 2004). 
193 Several lower courts have implied that management-level employees must be 
involved to impute scienter to a corporation, but there has not been extensive 
discussion, and some courts fail to make any distinction at all. See, e.g., 
Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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The absurdity analysis, once again, is not saddled with the 
same unreasonable consequences.  With collective scienter, in the 
context of an absurdity analysis, limited to dramatic 
announcement about the company, it is not unreasonable to 
require a company to take extra compliance measures to ensure 
the statements they are releasing are true and accurate.  Day-to-
day operations would be minimally affected, because 
announcements or disclosures that concern ordinary day-to-day 
business would not be under the gamut of the absurdity analysis. 
B. Absurdity Analysis Is Consistent with Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence on Private Rights of Action 
Since the early 1990s, the Supreme Court has continually 
cut back on the expansiveness of the private right of action in 
Rule 10b-5 causes of action.194  There is a consistent trend in 
scaling back expansive doctrines that would otherwise allow 
plaintiffs to plead and prove liability through less onerous 
means.195  At the same time, however, the Court has never 
completely quashed the private right of actions or many of the 
theories underlying it.196  The Court has generally issued narrow 
holdings that begin to close the door on innovative or expansive 
liability methods but do not close it completely.197 
Adopting a collective theory of scienter similar to the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach would fit well in this pattern of 
jurisprudence.198  Courts could eliminate the possibility of 
circumventing pleading standards through both the strong and 
weak collective scienter.  This would limit the availability that 
plaintiffs have in imputing liability to the corporation at the 
pleading stage.  However, it would not make it impossible to 
plead corporate scienter through methods outside of the classic 
respondeat superior method.  The absurdity analysis would offer 
a small doorway that could be used in mostly extreme situations 
for the plaintiffs to clear the pleading hurdle. 
194 See supra Part I.C. 
195 See id. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. 
198 See id. 
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C. Absurdity Analysis Fits Squarely with the Strong Inference of 
Scienter and the Holistic Approach. 
Most importantly, the absurdity analysis fits squarely with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, the last time the Court 
has spoken on the issue of scienter.  To begin, the absurdity 
analysis is congruent with the definition of strong inference of 
scienter.  The Court defined strong inference as “at least as likely 
as any plausible opposing inference.”199  When a dramatic 
announcement is made by a company, it is very plausible that 
corporate officers knew the statements were false.  The absurdity 
analysis would not apply to gray areas where there is room for 
debate over what the corporate officers knew.  The analysis 
inherently adopts the strong inference standard because it is 
limited to such absurd situations where the inference would most 
likely be much more cogent than any innocent plausible 
inference. 
Furthermore, the absurdity analysis fits well with the 
holistic scienter analysis that Tellabs described.  In interpreting 
the holisitic analysis, one court stated, “In assessing the 
allegations holistically as required by Tellabs, the federal courts 
certainly need not close their eyes to circumstances that are 
probative of scienter viewed with a practical and common-sense 
perspective.”200  The absurdity analysis fits well with this 
commonsense perspective.  When an important or dramatic 
announcement is made by a company that is clearly false, it is 
likely that corporate officers have knowledge of its falsity or were 
deliberately reckless. 
D. Absurdity Analysis Applied to Scenario A 
The hypotheticals from the start of this Note demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the absurdity analysis.  In the first 
hypothetical, a company’s marquee product had a serious 
mechanical defect.  The government investigation, along with the 
internal reports, demonstrated that the company was aware that 
the defects existed.  However, prior to discovery, plaintiffs are 
not able to identify exactly which corporate officers knew of the 
defects. 
199 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007). 
200 See S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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Without any type of collective scienter, the plaintiffs would 
not be able to impute liability to the corporation.  The classic, 
universally accepted method of imputing liability from a specific 
individual would be unavailable.  While the plaintiffs know the 
CEO was the person who made the statement, at this point in the 
litigation, they cannot determine if he was aware of the 
government investigation or of the internal reports. 
However, with a collective scienter theory utilizing the 
absurdity analysis, the plaintiffs could survive the pleading stage 
of the litigation.  When a company’s marquee product is 
experiencing serious mechanical problems, it would be absurd for 
corporate officers of the company not to be aware of it.  Therefore, 
plaintiffs would be able to successfully plead corporate liability 
through the absurdity analysis of collective scienter. 
CONCLUSION 
The Seventh Circuit’s absurdity analysis, which has been 
generally accepted by other jurisdictions, furthers Congress’s 
purpose in enacting PLSRA and is consistent with Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.  The pleading standard for scienter has 
been a topic of debate since the enactment of PSLRA, and the 
Court’s jurisprudence has not presented a clear standard for the 
circuit courts to apply.  Adopting the absurdity analysis will be a 
substantial step in providing a uniform system of pleading 
scienter in Rule 10b-5 suits.  From a normative perspective, it is 
important to note that the absurdity analysis will further the 
broad-based goals of securities litigation.  Corporations will not 
be able to skirt liability through a glorified ignorance defense.  
Instead, the absurdity analysis will offer an extra measure of 
protection to the securities market and protect those at the heart 
of all securities legislation—investors. 
 
